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SLOVENIA BETWEEN LIBERALIZATION AND 
DEMOCRA TIZA TION? 
Cyril A. Zebot 
I. The Concepts of Liberalization and Democratization* 
During the visit to Yugoslavia, March 14-19, 1988, by the Soviet leader Mikhail 
Gorbachev, The Washington Post of March 15, wrote: "(Gorbachev] is also to visit the 
(northwestern] Yugoslav republic of Slovenia, where a liberal local regime has developed 
a radical model of political pluralism under communism." A follow-up report in the same 
newspaper of March 17, the day Gorbachev was in Slovenia, said that "the Soviet leader 
asked to visit Slovenia because of its status as a Communist-ruled region that is most 
advanced in economic development and political liberalization. " On the same day The New 
York Times correspodent wrote from Ljubljana: "Hard-working Slovenia ... has often 
marched to a different drumbeat than most of Yugoslavia, wielding the tools of economic 
restructuring to pursue its own development and interests ... its Communist leaders have 
opened up the intellectual debate to a wider degree than is evident elsewhere in the 
country." Such reports naturally provoke the question: What kind of "political pluralism" 
did Gorbachev find in Slovenia? 
There is a broad consensus among foreign observers that since the death in 1980 of 
Yugoslavia's President-for-life Josip Broz-Tito, developments in Slovenia have indeed 
evolved more and further than in other republics of multinational Yugoslavia. Sometimes 
one even gets the impression that Slovenia is on the verge of independence and ready for 
transition to democratic rule. Calling in its title Slovene dissidents "The Champions of 
Glasnost", an editorial in The Economist of March 19, 1988 asked: "Are there any taboos 
left in Slovenia?" 
There is no doubt that, at its roots, the difference between Slovenia and the rest of 
Yugoslavia has to do with Slovenia's ethnic homogeneity as well as its cultural and 
economic affinity and proximity to the West as a sort of mini-Europe in the geographic 
center of the old continent on "the sunny side of the Alps". However, even in Slovenia 
political and economic evolution has not reached as far as readers of the above and similar 
reports may have inferred. Misunderstandings stem from the failure to distinguish between 
two related but quite different evolutionary concepts: liberalization vs. democratization. 
Liberalization, in reference to today's Communist regimes, means different things in 
different countries, but these differences are all to be found in the following categories: 
greater assertion of policy differences within the ruling Communist Party, limited recog-
nition of human and civil rights to the citizens and, at its most liberal, toleration of various 
dissident phenomena. Within these categories liberalization is expansible or reversible by 
decisions of the Communist Party leadership. The Slovene Communist Party (League of 
Communists) has permitted liberalization in Slovenia to expand farther than it has in other 
republics of Yugoslavia. Glasnost (with perestroika) is Gorbachev's (not yet fully clari-
fied) version and extent of "liberalization" for the Soviet Union. In no case has liberaliza-
tion affected the political monopoly of the ruling Communist party. 
The concept of democratization, on the other hand, extends, as the etymological 
meaning of the word suggests, essentially beyond liberalization. It involves legalization 
of organized political opposition with a view to making possible equal participation of all 
the people in the electoral processes of periodically selecting a country's government and 
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checking on its performance in between. In other words, democratization means an end 
to the political monopoly of the ruling Communist party. Once achieved, democratization 
can be reversed only by successful internal or external military suppression. 
To clarify these differences, historical examination as well as contemporary analysis are 
needed. This is a sketch for such a study of multinational Yugoslavia with special regard 
to the Republic of Slovenia, among the republics of Yugoslavia the "most advanced in 
economic development and political liberalization". 1 
II. Slovene Territory and the Period Between the Wars 
After the horrors visited upon Slovenia in World War II by virtue of its triple occupation 
in April 1941 (by the Germans in the North, the Italians in the South and the Hungarians 
in the East)2 and the concomitant Communist terrorism against their helpless non-Commu-
nist compatriots, the Slovenes, at war's end in May 1945, found themselves again, as after 
World War I, a part of Yugoslavia with Belgrade as the domineering center of a multina-
tional state. There was an important difference, however: while after WW I the incipient 
Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes had been a constitutional monarchy, after 
World War II the Belgrade domination was a Stalinist-type dictatorship. 
As all of Europe, prewar Slovenia also had its share of economic and social problems. 
But those problems were amenable to progressive solutions in the framework of the 
Slovene democratic tradition. A Bolshevik-type revolution-such as the Communists 
started during the enemy occupation under the disguise of the "war of national libera-
tion" -certainly was not the remedy for them. Slovene social and economic problems were 
not even primarily of a "class" nature: they stemmed from the fact that between the two 
world wars Slovenia lacked a government of its own. That was the key factor which, after 
World War I, slowed down the exceptionally promising economic and social development 
experienced in the central Slovene province of Carniola since the democratic reform of 
Habsburg Austria in 1908.3 
For that promising development to continue after World War I, it was necessary that all 
the Slovene lands of the defunct Habsburg Empire be united under a sovereign and 
democratic Slovene government. Unfortunately, these two prerequisites were not fulfilled. 
As much as one third of the Slovene territory, including the entire Slovene part of the 
Adriatic coast, was seized by Italy, the new German Austria and Hungary. Even the bulk 
of Slovenia that became part of the new Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 
(SHS)-later renamed "Yugoslavia"-had less autonomy in its "own" new state than the 
above mentioned Slovene province of Carniola had possessed in the Habsburg Empire. The 
first SHS constitution of June 1921 established pluralistic and secret elections but did not 
recognize the right of self-government of the constituent nations. The Kingdom of SHS 
was democratic as far as relations between individual citizens and the government were 
concerned (a constitutional monarchy) but autocratically repressive in relations between its 
nations and the government. 
The failure of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes to provide its member-na-
tions with the needed political autonomy for their own national development became the 
cause of increasing tensions and frictions. Instead of resolving them by a change of the 
Serbian-imposed constitution of the original Kingdom of SHS in a (con)federal direction, 
King Alexander in January 1929 disbanded the parliament, abolished the constitution, and 
instituted his own dictatorship. Later he also did away with the multinational name (SHS) 
of the country and renamed it "Yugoslavia" as if it had been the country of a (nonexistent) 
nation of the "South Slavs". This unnatural attempt came to an end when the King was 
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assassinated during a visit to France in October 1934. 
A Regency Council was established with Prince Paul, a British-educated cousin of the 
late King, as one of its three members. Under his leadership a process of gradual re-democ-
ratization was begun which also aimed at a (con)federal reorganization of the multinational 
country. The political leader of the Croats, Dr. Vladimir Macek, became the head of the 
so-called "United Opposition" in which Serbian opposition groups were also represented. 
However, Dr. Macek's Serbian opposition partners were not willing to agree with him on 
the Croatian demand for a (con)federal reorganization of the multinational country. The 
Serbo-Croatian stalemate was broken by Prince Paul when he directed the Prime Minister, 
Dr. Dragisa Cvetkovic, to reach an agreement on (con)federal reorganization of 
Yugoslavia with Dr. Macek on behalf of the Crown. In August 1939 an autonomous state 
(Banovina) of Croatia was established as the cornerstone of a projected new (con)federal 
union whose composition was to be determined through further negotiations among the 
political representatives of Yugoslavia's national components. Before this laborious pro-
cess could yield the final agreement, a group of Serbian officers, taking advantage of 
Yugoslavia's diplomatic difficulties in a Europe dominated by Hitler, staged a palace coup 
in Belgrade, on March 27,1941, toppling the Prince-Regent and his government. At that 
point Hitler decided to complete his domination of southeastern Europe by annihilating a 
dubious Yugoslavia which he did with a Blitz air attack on Belgrade on April 6, 1941. A 
multiple Axis occupation followed. 
III. Post-War Yugoslavia and The Sovereignty of Equal Nations 
The only good consequence of World War II for Slovenia was the return to Slovenia of 
the bulk of rural areas of the Slovene-populated maritime provinces which, after WW I, 
had been taken by Italy. Yet, at the end of the War, Slovenia was again left without the 
port-city of Trst/Trieste (together with its Slovene coastline north of the City), without the 
city of GoricalGorizia (together with the Slovene populated region along the river Socal 
Isonzo south of the city), without so-called Venetian Slovenia, northwest of Gorizia, and 
without Kanalska dolinalKanaltallVal Canale in the Julian Alps. All these Slovene lands 
were again annexed to Italy, while the Slovene-populated southern Carinthia was left to 
the restored German Austria. Thus in spite of all the Slovene suffering in the War the 
age-old objective of a United Slovenia was again denied to the Slovene people, all for the 
benefit of Italy and Austria, both of which not only had been de-Slovenizing by force 
sizeable Slovene minorities after WW I, but during the war had actively participated in the 
destructive Axis occupation of all of Slovenia. This was truly one of the great injustices 
as well as political mistakes of WW II.4 
Moreover, territorially mutilated Slovenia within postwar Yugoslavia remained without 
national self-government. It is true that already the first constitution of postwar Yugoslavia 
(1946)-based on the wartime agreement that postwar "Yugoslavia should be built on a 
democratic and federal principle as a community of nations of equal rights"S - talked about 
the country's federal structure. However, the postwar Stalinist regime paid little attention 
to its own constitutional and legal provisions or promises; self-government of constituent 
nations, viz., republics for a long time remained blocked. It was more than twenty years 
later that, with a sequence of constitutional amendments between I 967 and 1971, the 
principle of the original sovereignty of Yugoslavia's constituent republics finally asserted 
itself. 
The long-delayed implementation of the wartime commitment to institute a new 
Yugoslavia as a union of equal nations coincided with the accession to power of younger 
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political cadres in the republics who were less burdened with the past Stalinistic excesses. 6 
Some of these younger leaders took constitutional changes very seriously. This scared the 
leaders of the old guard in the Communist party. Only six months after the decentralizing 
constitutional amendments had been adopted, the top party leadership decided that the 
daring younger leaders in the republics had to go. The untoward consequences of this 
decision have been far-reaching and still dominate the country. 
After the purges, top governmental functions in the republics again passed into the hands 
of more subservient but also less capable political opportunists who, in connivance with 
lesser autocrats in municipalities and with the political and bureaucratic center in Belgrade, 
have managed to ruin Yugoslavia's economy. The root cause was the stubborn hold by the 
Old-Guard Communist leadership on to its monopolistic political power in the pursuit of 
two objectives: first, not to permit real enterprise autonomy and open markets lest they 
erode Party control over the economy and citizens; and second, to continue administrative 
redistribution of income and capital in favor of the perennially "less developed" regions 
that have been the political mainstay of Belgrade centralism. This double-duty Belgrade 
centralism has continued at the expense of the self-reliant "developed" areas; in Slovenia, 
especially, antiquated plant and equipment could no longer be properly replaced and 
modernized to keep pace with the technological development in the neighboring Central-
Western Europe, of which not so long before Slovenia had been a part. 
It was thus that after the decentralizing constitutional changes in 1967-1971, marred by 
the sweeping political purges of 1972, Yugoslavia, instead of having a self-managed 
market economy with mutually complementary economic development of autonomous 
republics, saw its economy degenerate into autarchic neofeudalism of Communist poten-
tates at all levels and points of the government stmcture. 7 When, at that juncture, within 
a year from each other, the two remaining top leaders of the Yugo-Communist regime both 
died (Edvard Kardelj in 1979, followed by Josip B. Tito in 1980), the accumulated 
economic difficulties had blended into a general political and social crisis which today still 
plagues the country. This malaise has been aggravated by some twenty billion dollars of 
foreign debts in hard currencies, most of which "Yugoslavia"s had incurred in the late 
seventies but has since had difficulties in servicing because they had been poorly invested 
while the confiscatory political administration of the incoming foreign exchange has caused 
quality exports to keep falling short. 
IV. The Accumulating Economic Crisis: Problems and Solutions 
It is not possible in this essay to deal with all the various consequences of the accumu-
lated crisis. Let us just mention that at the end of 1987 the rate of inflation reached about 
170 percentS which, by European standards, was unique. When inflation is this high, most 
legal personal incomes necessarily trail it. This is why "illicit" strikes have multiplied as 
have "concealed" economic activities of all kinds (a widespread underground or "gray" 
economy) by means of which politically well-connected and/or more inventive people try 
to secure productive employment or just try to protect their previous standard of living. 
The original responsibility for these and other economic and social woes resides in the 
wrong economic and political system which suppresses personal initiative and responsibil-
ity across the board. 
The only way out is to free economic enterprises of administrative shackles, legalize the 
non-fraudulent parts of the underground economy with the freeing of all domestic prices, 
including wages and interest rates, while progressively abolishing subsidies to losing 
enterprises and imposing strict financial discipline from the National Bank down to the 
BETWEEN LIBERALIZA nON AND DEMOCRA nZA nON? 235 
least participant in the economy. In a market economy the participants must live up to their 
contractual commitments freely entered into between financially independent economic 
subjects - buyers and sellers of scarce goods and services for consumption as well as 
production-according to their market-determined and market-oriented economic incen-
tives. 
Such an economy is efficient, because in it competition minimizes prices and costs while 
maximizing participants' economic gains or, in some cases, at least minimizing their 
losses. Institutional and operational details of the overdue reform to this effect must be left 
to the republics so that they could adapt the pace of the transition to their greatly diverse 
conditions. If Slovenia feels that it is ready for such an economic reform, why should it 
wait until Kosovo feels the same way? 
The opposite view-that for a multinational economy to be efficient even more central-
ization is necessary than Belgrade already possesses-is without foundation in logic or 
fact. Indeed the federal government already controls 64% of all the tax revenues of the 
country while all the republics and autonomous provinces together receive only 17.6% 
(with the remainder going to local govemments).l0 By any definition this is a telling 
indicator of an excessive degree of centralization in a multinational (con)federation. 11 For 
an efficient economy, open markets are necessary with the concomitant legal safeguards. 
The most effective multinational common market exists in the European Economic Com-
munity whose members are twelve sovereign states, every one of which has a national 
economy of its own; yet they freely exchange goods and services on their agreed-upon 
market. 
For Yugoslavia, after its long chain of centralistic and administrative failures, it should 
by now be clear that its economic enterprises must be endowed with a self-responsible, 
market-oriented entrepreneurship of their own empowered and competent to engage in 
competition in free market-local, republican, interrepublican, and foreign. It should also 
be obvious that for competition to be as effective as possible ideological limitations 
imposed on the amount of land a family farm can own as well as similar limitations on 
personal, viz., private enterprises in other fields must be eliminated. 
V. The Yugoslav Political System: Slovene Historical Antecedents 
Yugoslavia's political system is also in need of substantial reform. The seventy years 
since the inception of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918 have 
abundantly confirmed that the multinational character of the country is irreversible. 12 
Yugoslavia consists of several nations in the full European sense. These societies are 
defined by their own ethnic characteristics, culture and even civilization and live on their 
own inherited territory. Yugoslavia's "multinational reality" is made up primarily of the 
three nations that were listed in the name of the original Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes (SHS) between 1918 and 1929. Three other nations (the Macedonians, Montene-
grins, and Bosnia's Moslems) achieved recognition after World War II. As other nations 
of the world, these nations also naturally tend to self-government for the obvious reason 
that in modern conditions no nation can preserve its continuing existence and progress 
without a government of its own to complement the cultural and economic activities of its 
members with the necessary national services. 
Let us now take a closer look at the historical emergence of Slovenia. As other nations 
in central, eastern and southeastern Europe that were forced to live under the domination 
of the respective master-nations (races) in the German, Habsburg, Russian and Ottoman 
Empires, the Slovenes, too, toward the middle of 19th century began consciously to assert 
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their need and will for a national state of their own. Until World War I many Slovenes kept 
hoping that their nation would achieve this essential political goal by the unification of all 
Slovene lands into a United Slovenia as one of the national states of a (con)federally 
reorganized Habsburg Empire, whose multinational diversity would be bound into a 
successful union by almost ideal economic complementarities of member-nations as well 
as similarities in culture and way of life. 
It was because of the outrageous oppression in Slovenia by the German military rule in 
Austria during the first three years of World War I that the Slovenes finally became 
convinced that there was no future for them as a nation in the Habsburg Empire. They 
realized that Habsburg Austria had irretrievably fallen prey to its own German nationalists 
who did not want the multinational Empire to become a union of equal nations but instead 
wanted a closer union, if not an outright merger, with the neighboring German Empire. 
It was thus that they viewed Slovene provinces in Austria-extending between the south-
eastern Alps and the northern Adriatic coast around Trieste-as a natural obstacle to their 
objective of turning Trieste into a directly-controlled maritime outlet for a united Austria 
and Germany. For the ruling Pan-Germans the only "solution" was to use their political 
and economic hegemony as a means to Germanize this Slovene "obstacle" which ethnically 
separated the German north from the "warm waters" of the Adriatic. 
In summary, despite the economic and other benefits from many centuries of common 
life in Central Europe, the Slovenes decided to leave Habsburg Austria in order to preserve 
the national existence. It is quite obvious therefore that they did not enter Yugoslavia (i.e. 
the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) in 1918 with the intention of becoming 
Serbs or being otherwise culturally crippled and economically impoverished. In seventy 
years of experience with Belgrade centralism their view of the future of Yugoslavia has 
crystallized into the following simple proposition: Because of its multinational character, 
Yugoslavia can only be a union of sovereign nations for unquestionably common matters, 
which each member-state, in its own recognized national interest, has voluntarily accepted 
as such-or there will be no Yugoslavia. Essentially this includes coordination (not 
unification) of national defenses of member-states to enhance their common outward 
security, a common legal framework to establish and to maintain a freely functioning 
common market-and whatever else all of them may want to undertake in common. i3 
VI. Yugoslav Political Reform: Pressures for Centralization 
In 1987-1988 a controversial process was under way in Yugoslavia to prepare certain 
constitutional changes in the guise of helping to solve the ongoing economic crisis. A 
succession of proposals from Belgrade revealed a clear intention to augment the powers 
of the central government. i4 Communist leaders in Slovenia have spoken openly against 
such reactionary changes. In defending the achieved constitutional autonomy of the 
republics, Slovene party leaders have responded to the virtually unanimous demands of 
Slovene public opinion. '5 But-as it was stated in a dispatch to The New York Times by 
its correspondent from Ljubljana on the day of Gorbachev's visit to Slovenia- the Slovene 
Communist leadership is "under pressure from the national Government to close ideolog-
ical ranks in order to better confront the nation's economic woes. ,,16 The irony was that 
Slovenia resisted this pressure not only from political recognition of an already excessive 
government centralization in Belgrade, but also because it knew too well that further 
centralization could only worsen the economic crisis since Belgrade had been using its 
powers for counter-productive administrative measures instead of permitting free markets 
to function. 17 At this writing it was not yet clear whether the Communist leadership in 
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Slovenia would persist in opposing these centralistic practices and ultimately deny the 
consent of the Republic of Slovenia without which the existing federal constitution cannot 
be changed. 
Repeated pressures for centralization bring to mind the original sin of both Yugoslavias 
after each of the two World Wars. When on December 1, 1918, the victorious Serbs 
imposed their own terms for the new Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, not only 
did the Serbian royal house become the arbiter of "last resort", but the Serbian capital of 
Belgrade became the seat of the government of the new multinational state. The dominating 
Serbs made good use of both these original advantages. A similar development was 
repeated after WW II. After the central government had been established in Belgrade in 
October 1944, the seat of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was also transferred from 
Zagreb to Belgrade in 1945. 
One may therefore conclude that in Yugoslavia, together with a consistently confederal 
reorganization of the multinational country, an additional constitutional change is needed: 
To transfer the capital of the confederalunion from Belgrade to another city that will be 
geographically more central and will not be at the same time the capital of one of the 
constituent republics. 
VII. The Western Powers Views on Yugo-Unitarianism 
It can frequently be heard that the great Western democracies (USA, Great Britain, 
France etc.) view Yugoslavia as if it were a one-nation (unitarian) state. This probably was 
true concerning prewar Yugoslavia until the agreement between the Crown and the 
Croatian political leader Vladimir Macek in August 1939 with which the multinational 
reality of Yugoslavia was for the first time substantively confirmed. Concerning postwar 
Yugoslavia, the attitudes of Western Powers have been more complex. Already the first 
constitution of postwar Yugoslavia in January 1946 proclaimed the country to be a federal 
state of several nations. But until the mid-sixties the Communist regime of postwar 
Yugoslavia was not only dictatorial (essentially Stalinist) but also centralistic (essentially 
Leninist). And even after the adoption of decentralizing constitutional changes in 1967-
1974 the ruling Communist party (the renamed League of Communists) has stayed com-
mitted to the Leninist principle of "democratic centralism" anchored in Belgrade. 
It is not so strange, therefore, that the foreign policy of Western powers toward postwar 
Yugoslavia has again been leaning toward Yugo-unitarism. Even when, after the death of 
Josip B. Tito in 1980, Yugoslavia's slide toward a general social crisis was accelerated, 
one could increasingly hear voices in the West saying that the federal government in 
Belgrade needed more powers if it was to succeed in controlling the accumulated economic 
difficulties amidst the country's high foreign indebtedness in convertible hard currencies. IS 
In the ensuing years of the eighties it became clear, however, that the Belgrade 
government has had enough power to cope with the accumulated difficulties, but has not 
been willing to adopt market-oriented remedies. 19 It has preferred to continue its admin-
istratively redistributive policies in favor of the chronically subsidized regions and enter-
prises at the expense of the self-sustaining ones and to the detriment of the country as a 
whole. When, at the same time, dissident movements began to expand by leaps and 
bounds, particularly in Slovenia,20 the centralistic bias of Western policies toward 
Yugoslavia became less noticeable. This subtle change was probably helped by the fact 
that the Belgrade government kept evading the advice of the International Monetary Fund 
urging freer market relations and less subsidization of chronically losing enterprises, a 
policy orientation that consecutive Yugoslav governments had themselves been repeatedly 
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proclaiming but never following. 
The official policy of the United States toward Yugoslavia was concisely restated by 
Michael M. Armacost, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, in June 1986 when 
he described the American policy as "the support of independence, unity and integrity of 
Yugoslavia".21 Two years earlier A. Ross Johnson, a noted American authority on 
Yugoslavia, had expressed the American policy as "the support of independence, territorial 
integrity and well-being". Since the subject isjoreign policy, the word "unity" sounds like 
another word for the expression "territorial integrity" without any other substantive signif-
icance of its own. Yet, official formulation of foreign policy should be simple and clear. 
Because of this redundancy one could suspect that the Armacost version must have been 
welcome by the crypto-unitarist political circles in Yugoslavia that continue to press for 
greater centralization in Belgrade. Because of its deceptive redundancy and potentially 
damaging ambiguity, the word "unity" should quietly disappear from future formulations 
of the policy of the United States and other Western powers toward Yugoslavia. 
The West should encourage developments in Yugoslavia which encourage democratic 
institutions based on full human and national rights. The history of both Yugoslavia has 
shown convincingly that the realization of potential benefits from a union of its nations 
depends on their mutual confidence, not on force. To the extent that the nations of 
Yugoslavia have recognized common concerns and interests, mutual confidence will bind 
them together in a viable union. 
VIII. Suggested Policies for Political Democratization 
In conclusion, Yugoslavia needs constitutional reform that respects the sovereignty of 
each of its member-states (republics) and provides for joint direction of freely agreed upon 
common concerns. For free selection of political programs and their administrators as well 
as for the protection of human rights, it is essential that the citizens of each member-state 
be allowed to choose at least between two mutually independent political parties. This 
requires that the existing Leagues of Communists in the constitutent republics (as well as 
their parent-League of Communists of Yugoslavia) give up their political monopoly which 
is incompatible with a free society. The constitution must affirm the right of citizens to 
establish and to join non-Communist political parties as they do other voluntary associa-
tions. 
This still leaves unresolved the most important problem: How to implement the union 
of sovereign member-states and a more-than-one-party prerequisite for democracy? How 
fast or gradually should the necessary changes be carried out? These "hows" constitute the 
dynamics of the twin transition of Yugoslavia about which a distant observer is not in a 
position to say much more than what I have already said. I do have, however, an idea as 
to how to introduce a more-than-one-party political system in Slovenia. r said something 
about it twenty years ago when, for the first time, similar changes had been talked about: 
"Tito has only one outcome that would secure continuity: To accept the necessity 
to reorganize the Communist party so that it would leave its hitherto hiding 
ground in the Socialist Alliance of the Working People. That would make it 
possible for the latter to live a political life of its own independently from, and 
in full equality with, the Communist party. This would be the road by which they 
could reach the condition of two mutually independent political organizations as 
the minimal requisite for a working democracy that (in Yugoslavia) has 
repeatedly been promised but never attained. "23 
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Tito, of course, did not opt for such a reform. The political structure he left behind 
consists of eight Communist parties, one each in the six republics and two autonomous 
provinces, to correspond to the (con)federal reorganization of the government of multina-
tional Yugoslavia in 1971. But this decentralized political structure continues to operate 
in the framework of the parent Communist party of Yugoslavia to satisfy the Leninist 
principle of "democratic centralism" which is to guarantee overall conformity with the 
overriding Communist nature of the regime. 
Yet an important aspect of liberalization in Slovenia is precisely in the area of intra-(or 
inter-) party relationships where the Slovene party leadership has recently been asserting 
significant policy differences with the leadership of the Yugoslav party, particularly in 
connection with the proposed constitutional changes in 1987-1988.24 
The Titoist political structure was once half-facetiously described as a "one-and-a-half-
party system." The additional "one half' was in reference, not to the existence of the 
subordinate Communist party pluralism, but to the so-called Socialist Alliance of the 
Working People which operates like a transmission belt of the ruling Communist party (of 
"workers") in each republic to facilitate its reaching non-Communist citizens ("working 
people"). This is the principal area where developments in Slovenia went farther than in 
other republics, a fact that may justify the above appellation (" 1.5") as a symbolic indicator 
of a potential further change. There are quite a few organizations, institutions and even 
officially subsidized media in Slovenia that may be said to be persistently or growingly 
"dissident" but operate within or in the close periphery of the loose structure of the Socialist 
Alliance. 15 
However, even in the Republic of Slovenia liberalization has stopped far short of 
democratization as a process that aims at bringing about the possibility of equal political 
participation for all the citizens, communist as well as noncommunist. Even in "liberal" 
Slovenia the opponents of the one-party regime cannot constitute themselves into indepen-
dent political parties as the Communists are organized in their own. Unfortunately for the 
theory of social evolution in its application to Communist systems stemming from the 
Bolshevik revolution of 1917, no Leninist party in power anywhere in the world has as yet 
crossed the political Rubicon that separates liberalization from democratization. 
In spite of this universal record to the contrary, one can still ask whether, for some 
so-far-unexplained reason, the League of Communists of Slovenia may be on the verge of 
a pioneering crossover from liberalization to democratization. Only time will provide the 
answer. But when? 
If and when further developments will push the Communist party leadership toward 
political democratization, it may perhaps become, at least in Slovenia, easier to make the 
necessary transition by, say, tacitly permitting the existing Socialist Alliance to become 
free of the ideological tutelage and organizational control of the Communist party. Such 
a development would yield an additional benefit. Starting with only two independent 
political parties-a newly independent Slovene Socialist Alliance in electoral competition 
with the old League of Communists - the fledgling process of democratization would avoid 
the danger of a counterproductive splintering of the politically less experienced and 
younger opponents of the one-party monopoly. For one has to keep in mind the difference 
between the essentially spontaneous phenomenon of "dissidence" (a category of 
"liberalization") on the one hand, and organized political "opposition" (a category of 
"democratization") on the other. To be a dissident is essentially an individualized intellec-
tual phenomenon, a "voice crying in the wilderness" that only remotely helps to prepare 
the way for structured political opposition as an essential ingredient of a working democ-
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racy. A Socialist Alliance capable of becoming independent could become a convenient 
transition from the intellectual position of dissidence to a new situation of effective political 
opposition which can be effective only if it can find active support beyond the intellectual 
community in the broad strata of the population. 
In Slovenia, democratization has an added meaning, for it will also solve the need for 
"national reconciliation" as a legacy of the fratricidal violence during and after WW II. 
Scattered all over Slovenia are mass graves not only of those Slovene Communists 
"liquidated" during the enemy occupation of Slovenia and of fallen partisans but also of 
thousands of former Slovene domobranci, whom-against all the pertinent international 
rules - the British occupation forces in Austria had forcibly repatriated across the Austrian-
Yugoslav border several weeks after the end of the war in May 1945. These unfortunate 
repatriates were virtually all brutally massacred by the newly implanted Communist 
regime. The leadership of the Communist party has yet publicly to admit and apologize 
for these mass murders. The massacres entered the domain of public knowledge only with 
the publication in 1975 in nearby Trieste (the originally Austrian and then Italian port city 
with a sizeable Slovene minority) of an interview with Edvard Kocbek, the wartime top 
non-Communist ally of the Communists in the wartime Slovene "Liberation Front" (OF). 
Kocbek's revelation caused a barrage of Communist attacks against him and the authors 
of the book in which his interview was published. Then something entirely unexpected 
happened: Amidst these hostile attacks Nasi Razgledi, a Communist-controlled Slovene 
biweekly review for intellectuals, reprinted the text of the Kocbek interview. 26 This made 
it official, as it were, just short of the regime's own admission of the massacre. 
When asked in the interview the follow-up question: "What do you think it would be 
necessary to do concerning the horrible fate of the Slovene Homeguards?", Kocbek gave 
the following far-reaching answer: 
"Above all we have to lift it from the negation to public admission . . . 
Responsible people must explain how was it possible for the victorious 
Liberation to conceive within itself such a shameful fear of the opponent ... 
There is no valid theory that would generically select victims of a 
world-historical mission and abstractly decide the death of a fellow human being. 
Public admission of a guilt that concerns us all is at stake ... Until we publicly 
admit our guilt, our great guilt ... we Slovenes will never enter a pure and clear 
atmosphere of the future.,,27 
When Kocbek's injunction is met, democratization will complete national reconcilia-
tion. When democratization will allow all the people of Slovenia to participate on equal 
terms in the self-government of their own country in common recognition and actual 
exercise of the basic principle of the democratic rule, they will thereby all be reconciled 
into a bond of people with equal human and civil rights freely taking part in deciding 
political questions of Slovenia in accordance with the pluralistically determined majority 
rule. 
But democracy does not mean only equal human and civil rights for all the Slovenes and 
national reconciliation among them. Seventy years of experience in two Yugoslavias have 
taught the Slovenes that in a world of sovereign nations and international agreements they 
will not be able to assert their own national interests and to develop on equal terms with 
other nations if they remain deprived of their own sovereign statehood. Only unquestion-
able sovereignty of its republic will be the guarantee of the future of Slovenia. 
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POVZETEK 
SLOVENIJA MED LIBERALIZACIJO IN - DEMOKRATIZACIJO? 
Avtor govori 0 politicniil dogodkih v Slovelliji do pomladi 1988 in vidi v njih prej razvoj v smeri 
liberalizacije kot v smeri demokratizacije. 0 razliki med tema dvema konceptoma, v kolikor se 
nanasata na Slovel1ijo, awol' razpravlja v zvezi z zgodovillskom razvojem Slovenije po letu 1918 ill 
se zlasti po lew 1946, to je zlasti z razvojem, ki je dosegel svoj visek v ekol1omski krizi osemdesetih 
let. Dalje je I' C/anku podan pregled razvoja in izmenjavwlja politicnih sistemov v lugoslaviji po letu 
1918, s posebnim ozirom na njihov odnos do raznih vidikov politicne centralizacije (eden avto~jevih 
zakljuckov: glavno mesto lugoslavije bi lI1oralo biti neko centralno sredisce jederacije, ki bi ne bilo 
hkrati glavno mesto ene republik). V nadaljnjem je govor 0 uradni zunanji politiki Zdruzenih drzav 
do lugoslavije. Potem awol' razpravlja 0 politicnih linijah, ki bi utegnile pripraviti lugoslavijo na 
pot politicne demokratizacije, se posebno 0 odpravi politicnega in elektoralnega monopola, ki ga 
sedaj u~iva Konlllllisticna partija v drlavi. Ce bi, na primer, prislo do ustanovitve neodvisne 
Socialisticne zveze v Sloveniji, bi volitve zares nudile izbiro in bi bila mozna demokratska opozicija. 
Drug tak predpogoj je sprejeti zahtevo Edvarda Kocbeka illjavno priZllati krivdo v domobranski ajeri. 
In koncno in vendaI' je najmanj vazno - brez repllbliske suverenosti Slovenije lie gre. 
